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RECENT CASES

MITIGATION, AND REDUCTION OF Loss
OF MEDICAL EXPENSES UNDER BOTH MEDICAL PAYMENTS
AND LIABILITY COVERAGES IN FAMILY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY
DAMAGES-AGGRAVATION,

-RECOVERY

-The plaintiffs, two passengers riding in an automobile driven
by the defendant, were injured when the automobile overturned as
a result of the defendant-driver's attempt to avoid a rear end
collision. The plaintiffs then instituted a negligence action against
the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries. The defendant was insured under an automobile policy which provided, inter
alia, liability coverage and medical payments coverage. Before the
negligence suit came to trial, the defendant's insurance company
paid the two plaintiffs a sum of money pursuant to the medical
payments coverage in the policy. At the trial each plaintiff proved
his medical expenses and each received a damage verdict which
included an amount for these medical expenses. The trial court
denied the defendant-insured's motion for reduction of damages by
the amount which had previously been paid to the plaintiffs by the
defendant's insurer. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, affirming
the trial court decision, held that the automobile insurance policy
created separate coverages for medical expenses and for liability;
and that the prior recovery under the medical payments coverage
did not preclude recovery under the liability coverage. Blocker v.
Sterling, 251 Md. 55, 246 A.2d 226 (1968).
In order to properly analyze this decision (as in any decision
in which an insurance contract circumscribes the respective rights
and liabilities of the insured and the insurer) it is necessary to
examine the pertinent language in an attempt to ascertain the intention of the parties as to those rights and liabilities.' Here, the
pertinent language involved was found in the policy under Part I,
Liability, Coverage A, Bodily Injury Liability, and under Part IIExpenses for Medical Services, Coverage C, Medical Payments.
Part I, Coverage A provided that the defendant's insurer agreed
" 'to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages' by reason of bodily
injury... sustained by any person ... arising out of the ownership,
1. See Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855 (1953). In Levine v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 Misc. 135, 139, 112 N.Y.S.2d 397, 403 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1952), the court stated a "rule of construction" for insurance policies as follows:
"It is not the construction or interpretation which the cpompany gives to a
policy that governs. It is the plain mneaning understandable to 'Joe Doakes',
the average person, that counts."
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maintenance or use of the insured's automobile." ' 2 Part II-Coverage C provided that the insurer agreed to pay " 'all reasonable
expenses . . . for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray and dental
services . . .and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services . . .'to or for the insured and each relative
. . . and . . . any other person who sustains bodily injury caused
by accident while in or entering or alighting from the owned
automobile . . -.
Medical payments insurance is relatively new since it was first
inserted into automobile liability insurance policies in the late
1930's.4 By 1941 this particular insurance was being written in the
then 48 states, Alaska and Hawaii 5 as an endorsement to the
standard automobile liability policy. 6 It has been suggested that
medical payments coverage grew out of that particular condition
created by "guest statutes" in which the gratuitous guest has no
cause of action for injuries sustained as a result of the host's lack
of only ordinary care.7 The suggestion is that the host is still bound
to feel a certain "moral" responsibility for the guest's injuries
regardless of the guest passenger's inability to recover from the
host-driver in tort." The Supreme Court of Louisiana in Gunter v.
Lord9 clearly stated the rationale of medical payments when it
said:
The protection afforded the 'other person who sustains
bodily injury through accident,' even though the conduct
of the insured be blameless, is understandably conducive
to a feeling of satisfaction that some assistance is offered,
since concern and regret for an injury, though unintentionally
caused and without negligent conduct, is the usual, normal
reaction. Moreover, the injury sustained is immediate
and calls for instantaneous assistance; fault is often dependent on many considerations which cannot be quickly
assessed. . .o
From an examination of the appropriate language in the policy
in the instant case, it can be seen that under the liability coverage
2.
Blocker v. Sterling, 251 Md. 55, 246 A.2d 226, 227 (1968).
3. Id. at 227.
4.
Katz, Automobile Medical Payment Coverage-A Changing Concept?, 28 INS. COUNSEL J. 276 (1961).
5.
Id. at 277.
6.
1955 Wis. L. PEv. 483, 484.
7.
Id. at 484.
8.
Id.
9.
242 La. 943, 140 So.2d 11 (1962).
10.
Id. at 15-16. Another succinct rationale was offered by an Illinois Appellate Court:
"We think that the basic purpose of medical pay provisions . . . is to make available a
fund to assure prompt and adequate medical care when injury is incurred, to relieve the
physical suffering of the insured and to relieve the insured of the anxiety of not knowing
from what source the money to pay the bills is coming." Jackson v. Country Mut. Ins. Co.,
41 Ill.App.2d 300, 190 N.E.2d 490, 492 (1963).
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the insurer is obligated to pay only such sums as the insured shall
become "legally obligated to pay as damages." However, under
the medical payments provision, the insurer is assuming responsibility up to a stipulated amount for reasonable expenses for medical
relief-regardless of the negligence on the part of the insured."
Although the medical payments coverage is included in the same
policy as the liability for bodily injury coverage, it has been held
that the medical payments clause is in the nature of a separate and
distinct "third-party beneficiary health insurance contract" for
which the insurer charges a separable portion of the gross premium. 12 Indeed, the court here finds this to be the proper construction of the medical payments clause. 3 The justification for allowing
the injured claimant recovery under both coverages is that since
the liability and the medical payments coverages are separate
and distinct; therefore, a separate and distinct claim can and
should arise under each coverage. 14 In essence, the underlying
concept is that the insurer's liability under the medical payments
coverage is based on contract; whereas, the insurer's liability under
the liability coverage is based on tort.15
As a further justification for the recovery of medical expenses
under both coverages, the "Collateral Source Rule" is invariably
invoked by the courts.' 6 A good statement of the Collateral Source
Rule was declared in Hughes v. Clinchfield R. R. Co.' 7 as follows:
This doctrine establishes an exception to the general
rule that damages in negligence actions must be compensatory and render the beneficiary whole, by refusing to allow
credit to the beneficiary of a wrongdoer for money or services received by the beneficiary from sources other than
the wrongdoer.'
(emphasis added).
While the Collateral Source Rule is overwhelmingly accepted in
this country, 9 its wide acceptance has not been immune from a
11. Martinez v. Gulf Ins. Co., 68 N.M. 90, 358 P.2d 1003 (1961).
12. Nagy v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 219 A.2d 396 (R.I. 1966).
13. "American's policy created separate coverages, one of indemnity for Blocker and
one analogous to a personal accident policy for injured passengers in Blocker's car who
became by virtue of being injured, third party beneficiaries of the medical expense coverage contract." Blocker v. Sterling, 251 Md. 55, 246 A.2d 226, 230 (1968).
14. Moorman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Va. 244, 148 S.E.2d 874 (1966) ; Severson
v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W.2d 872 (1953) ; Accord, Hack v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 175 So.2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). (Hack allowed recovery under both
Uninsured Motorist coverage and Medical Payments coverage).
15. See Cookrum v. Travelers Indem. Co., 420 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
Williams v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 368 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
16. Beschnett v. Farmers Equitable Ins. Co., 275 Minn. 328, 146 N.W.2d 861 (1966)
Edmondson v. Keller, 401 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
17. 289 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
18. Id. at 375.
19. Melson v. Allmon, 24t A.2d 85 (Del. 1968) ; Huenink v. Collins, 181 Neb. 195, 147
N.W.2d 508 (1966) ; Patusco v. Prince Macaroni, Inc., 50 N.J. 365, 235 A.2d 465 (1967) ;
Bailey v. Jeffries-Eaves, Inc., 76 N.M. 278, 414 P.2d 503 (1966) ; Walker v. Missouri Pac.
R.R. Co., 425 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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wealth of criticism.2 0 Basically this doctrine provides that . . . "[I]n
computing damages against a tortfeasor, no reduction be allowed
on account of benefits received by the plaintiff from other sources,
even though they have partially or wholly mitigated his loss." . . .21
The rationale for the doctrine is simply that it is better for the
plaintiff to make a profit than for the "wrongdoer" defendant's
responsibility to be lightened through a reduction of his liability.
To illustrate, this means that in a tort action the defendant will
not be entitled to have his special damages reduced to the extent
that the plaintiff may have received compensation from the plaintiff's Blue Cross-Blue Shield policy, 22 from gratuitous medical services rendered by a fellow physician, 2 or from disability retirement
24
pay.
Having established what the doctrine is, the real question is
whether or not it should even apply in this case where recovery is
had under both medical payments and liability coverages. Is the
recovery under the medical payments coverage really a collateral
source? After all, when the defendant himself provides for medical
payments coverage, can it truly be said that this is a source collateral
to the defendant? There are decisions in which the facts are similar
if not identical to those in the instant case and yet different
results are reached. 25 In a recent decision on opposite result was
reached and a set-off allowed against the tort recovery by the
amount previously paid under "Medical Payments". The court
simply was of the opinion that the Collateral Source Rule does
not apply where the plaintiff's medical expenses are paid by the
defendant directly or by an insurance company under a policy procured by the defendant.26 The court's reasoning is persuasive:
Under those circumstances no one gets a windfall and
if a recovery were allowed under those circumstances the
result would be that the plaintiff would receive a double
recovery and that the defendant would be mulcted twice
for the same item of damages. Suppose, for example,
the defendant himself paid the plaintiff's entire medical bill
20.
E.g., Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 1478 (1966); Ghiardl, The Collateral Source Rule: Multiple Recovery in
Personal Injury Actions, 535 INs. L. J. 457 (1967) ; Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule
in the American Law of Damages, 4.6 MINN. L. Rx1v. 669 (1962) ; Peckinpaugh, An Analy-

ss of the CollateralSource Rule, 524 Ixs. L. J. 545 (1966).
21.

See

Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule

and Loss Allocation in

Tort Law, 54

CALIF. L. REv. 1478 (1966). Fleming remarks at 1478 that: "Its sting lies in the corollary
that the plaintiff may ordinarily keep both the damages as well as the collateral benefit
and thus turn his plight into a bonanza."
22.
23.
24.
25.
App.2d
Tart v.

26.

Phillips v. Bennett, 21 Utah2d 1, 439 P.2d 4[57 (1968).
Oddo v. Cardi, 218 A.2d 373 (R.1. 1966).
Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (Ala. 1967).
Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643 (D.D.C. 1965); Dodds v. Bucknum 214 Cal.
206, 29 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1963) ; Yarrington v. Thornburg, 205 A.2d 1 (Del. 1964)
Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962).

Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643 (D.D.C. 1965).
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prior to the institution of the action or prior to the trial.
Obviously the plaintiff would not be paid twice for the same
item and would not be permitted to recover his medical
bills as an item of special damages.
Here the defendant did not herself pay the medical
bills but brought into being at her own expense an2 insurance
7
policy out of which the medical bills were paid.
A California Appellate Court in disallowing medical expenses
in a tort action because they had been paid previously by defendant's
insurer under the medical payments provisions28 reasoned as follows:
It thus appears that if defendant had gone to the doctor
and hospital of plaintiff and had paid out of his own pocket
the indebtedness that plaintiff had incurred on account of
this accident, she could not have recovered them again
from him. In other words, her recovery would be diminished
by the amount personally paid by defendant. It can make
no difference either in principle or in justice that defendant
did not pay these bills out of his own pocket but that the
source of such payments was insurance purchased29 by defendant with his own funds for such an eventuality.
Those courts which allow a set-off from the damages by the
amount previously paid by a defendant's insurer under the medical
payments provision of the automobile policy make a valid distinction
in the Collateral Source Rule. The distinction is this: The tortfeasor
clearly has no interest in and no right to benefit from any money
received by the injured person from sources collateral to and unconnected with the tortfeasor. However, the doctrine does allow the
tortfeasor to obtain the advantage of payments made by himself
or from a fund created by him; in such case the payments come
30
not from any collateral source but from the defendant himself.
It follows that since the medical payments coverage is a fund created
the Collatral Source Rule simply should not
by the tortfeasor,
apply in this particular factual situation.3 1 It does appear clear,
however, that even in those jurisdictions which allow a set-off,
is for general damages only
no set-off is possible if the later suit
32
alleged.
are
damages
special
and no
27. Id. at 645.
28. Dodds v. Bucknum, 214 Cal. App.2d 206, 29 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1963).
29. Id., 29 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
30. Yarrington v. Thornburg, 205 A.2d 1, 2 (Del. 1964).
31. Contra, Beschnett v. Farmers Equitable Ins. Co., 275 Minn. 328, 146 N.W.2d 861
(1966). "We subscribe to the view that medical-payment provisions in a liability policy
qonstitute a collateral source without reference to what Party obtains and pays for the insurance." Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
32.
Gandy v. Feazel, 155 So.2d 474 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
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It should also be pointed out that in many cases the negligence
action against the defendant may be instituted first and a subsequent action brought directly against the defendant's insurer for
recovery of the medical expenses under the medical payments
clause. (Perhaps this situation occurs because insurance companies
do not always inform injured persons of the existence of a medical
payments provision.) 33 It behooves counsel representing an injured
claimant to investigate the possibility of medical payments coverage in the defendant's policy before concluding any settlement2 4
This is so, since otherwise a general release executed in favor of
both the defendant and the insurer would preclude a subsequent
action against the insurer for medical payments.3 5 But where a release is given by the claimant only to the defendant and the insurer
is not named, the plaintiff would not be prevented from bringing
a later action against the insurer to recover his medical expenses
under the medical payments coverage of the policy.3 6
Were this same case to come before a court in North Dakota
one can only hazard a guess as to the outcome.17 In Gillis v. Farmers Union Oil Company of Rhame, 38 the plaintiff who was a sergeant
in the U. S. Army was severely injured when his automobile collided with the defendant's automobile. He sued for both general
and special damages and was allowed full recovery despite the
fact that his medical expenses were furnished by the U. S. Army.3 9
(A true Collateral Source Rule Problem). This decision is not particularly helpful because it is certainly conceivable that North Dakota
may adhere to the Collateral Source Rule and yet not apply it when
this particular insurance issue at hand is presented.
If the purpose of our tort reparation system is still compensation for actual loss, it is difficult to perceive why a claimant should
be entitled to double recovery under both coverages in the automobile
insurance policy. What possible difference can it make if the defendant paid the plaintiff in cash or prudently set up an insurance fund
to provide for the contingency? Why penalize (yes, penalize) the
33.
34.

8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 350 74.10
Id.

(1962).

35. Barbour v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 141 A.2d 924 (D. C. Mun. Ct. App.
1958).
36. Beschnett v. Farmers Equitable Ins. Co., 275 Minn. 328, 146 N.W.2d 861 (1966).
37. Of course, a vital difference to any injured guiest passenger in North Dakota (as
opposed to Maryland) is the impact of the Guest Statute. In order for the guest-plaintiff
to recover under this statute he must prove that his injury proximately resulted from intoxication, willful misconduct, or gross negligence of the owner or driver. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 39-15-03 (1960).
38. 186 F. Supp. 331 (D. N.D. 1960).
39. "Apparently the Supreme Court of North Dakota has never passed upon the . . .
issue of whether an injured . . . may recover from a negligent defendant the reasonable
value of medical and hospital services rendered without charge by a . . . hospital . ...
This court is of the opinion that the Supreme Court of North Dakota, if and when such
issue is presented, will follow the so-called 'modern rule' . . ." Id. at 338. This "so-called
rule" is, of course, the Collateral Source Rule.
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person who was prudent and far-sighted enough to establish an
insurance fund and yet allow credit for one who does not provide
such a fund and yet happens fortuitously to have some cash on
hand at the time of the injury with which he pays for all or part
of the plaintiff's medical expenses? Also, might not this multiple
payment of the same expenses indirectly contribute to increasing
insurance costs to be borne by the general insurance premiumpaying public? A simple solution (and one which would avoid
the clearly erroneous application of the Collateral Source Rule by
those courts which allow recovery under both clauses) would be an
insertion of a specific exclusion in the automobile liability policy.
This exclusion could be worded to the effect that any amount payable under the liability coverage should be reduced to the extent
of any payments made under the medical payments coverage.
It is clear that if an insurer inserts an exclusion of this type into the
family automobile insurance policy, it would be upheld by the
40
courts in order to prevent a double recovery.
RICHARD N. JEFFRIES

INSURANCE-AVIATION

EXCLUSION

CLAUSE-WAR

AS

AN

INTER-

FORCE-Hostile ground fire struck the insured, a United
States Marine Corps helicopter co-pilot, while he was on a flight
over Vietnam. The helicopter returned safely to the base, where
the insured died the next day.
The decedent was insured with the defendant, the life insurance
policy providing in part:
VENING

"This policy is issued under the express condition that
should the death of the Insured occur as a result of operating
or riding in, or descending from, any kind of aircraft if
the Insured is a pilot, officer or member of the crew of such
aircraft . . . the Company's liability shall be limited . . ."
to a sum less than the face amount of the policy to be
computed in accordance with the formula set forth therein."'
On suit by the policy beneficiary for the proceeds, the defendant contended that death resulted from operating or riding in an
aircraft, within the scope of the exclusionary language, thus precluding recovery of the full face amount of the policy. The United
States District Court (Eastern District of Virginia) disagreed, con40. Gunter v. Lord, 242 La. 943, 140 So.2d 11 (1962) ; Bowers v. Hardware Mut. Cas.
Co., 119 So.2d 671 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
1. Mann v. Service Life Insurance Co,, 284 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Va. 1968).

